
KEPPEL LTD

TRANSFORMING INTO A GLOBAL ASSET MANAGER

ARE INVESTORS IN THE DARK?



REPORT OBJECTIVE

Keppel Ltd, once renowned for its offshore marine and real estate businesses, is undertaking a fundamental transformation to become a global asset manager with S\$200bn in funds under management (FUM) by 2030. It is unprecedented for an industrial operator to successfully transform into an asset manager of such scale. As such, close attention ought to be given to the progress and prospects of Keppel's transformation.

This report examines Keppel's current level of disclosures and if it allows stakeholders to meaningfully evaluate its progress and prospects. For reasonableness, local and global asset managers are used as benchmarks. Being a listed company and with FUM of S\$85bn, we believe the comparison is fair.

KEY TERMS

The asset management industry has certain terms that a reader will benefit from understanding.

Funds Under Management (FUM): This refers to the assets under the care of a fund manager, on which it charges a management fee. Keppel's 2030 goal is to have \$\$200bn worth of fee-bearing assets.

Internal Rate of Return (IRR): This is an annualized rate of return that a fund generates and is a common industry performance measure.

Multiple on Invested Capital (MOIC): This is used synonymously with **Multiple on Money (MOM)** and shows the total value generated by a fund relative to the capital invested. For example, an MOIC of 2 means the fund returned two times the capital invested.

Vintage Year: This refers to the year in which a fund deploys its capital, typically when it makes its first investment.

EBITDA: EBITDA refers to Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization. It is used to have a sense of the core operational profitability of a firm.

PATMI: This refers to Profit After Tax and Minority Interest and shows the 'final profit' available to shareholders.

ABOUT CORPORATE MONITOR LIMITED

Corporate Monitor Limited (CML) is an independent firm dedicated to producing objective, high-quality research. With a mission to foster stronger corporate performance and benefit the investment community, Corporate Monitor emphasizes thorough research and active engagement with companies.

Corporate Monitor does not provide investment advice nor does it engage in any stock trading.

Learn more about the Corporate Monitor and its Constitution at https://corporate-monitor.org/about/ The firm can be reached at corporate-monitor.org

DISCLOSURE: KEPPEL VS. OTHER ASSET MANAGERS



COMPARATOR SELECTION



A Singaporean property developer that is transforming into a global asset manager. Serves as a local benchmark.



With US\$137bn (~S\$180bn) in fee earning assets under management, its size is comparable to Keppel's 2030 goal of managing S\$200bn.



Widely regarded as best-in-class, it sets the example in the quality and depth of its disclosures.

When placed against local and global asset managers, it is clear that Keppel's disclosure is lacking. This deficit makes it extremely challenging for stakeholders to evaluate Keppel's current asset management performance and its prospects, leaving stakeholders in the dark as to whether Keppel's 2030 goal of being a global asset manager, with S\$200bn FUM, will succeed.

FUND PERFORMANCE IS NEEDED TO EVALUATE CURRENT AND FUTURE SUCCESS

ITS IMPORTANCE

A typical asset manager has many funds. Knowing each fund's performance allows for the assessment of the manager's skill via benchmarking. Institutional investors decide to invest or avoid a fund based on its past performance. As such, a fund that is doing well can be expected to lead to larger successor funds, while the converse is true for a poorly performing one.

Keppel X

Except for its public listed funds, which has to comply with disclosure regulations, Keppel does not disclose the performances of any of its other funds.

Returns achieved

17% IRR / 1.8x

equity multiple
average deal returns
since 2002

Its only disclosure was in the 1H23 presentation, with an ambiguous 17% IRR on <u>deal</u> returns (rather than <u>fund</u>)



Capitaland has a similar practice of not disclosing the performance of each funds, except for those already listed.



TPG clearly shows the performance metrics, both gross and net of fees and costs. It consistently does this for every fund, allowing stakeholders to evaluate its investment performance and track record.

Similarly, BlackStone discloses performance with IRR and MOIC.

(\$ in millions, as of 6/30/24)	Gross	Gross	Net	Net	
Fund	IRR ⁽⁷⁾	MoM ⁽⁷⁾	IRR ⁽⁸⁾	MoM ⁽⁹⁾	
Asia Real Estate					
Asia Realty					
Asia Realty I	6%	1.3x	3%	1.2x	
Asia Realty II	24%	1.8x	16%	1.6x	
Asia Realty III	14%	1.5x	9%	1.3x	
Asia Realty IV	19%	1.5x	12%	1.3x	
Asia Realty V	36%	1.1x	1%	1.0x	
Asia Realty	13%	1.5x	9%	1.3x	
Japan Value					
Japan Value ⁽¹³⁾	NM	NM	NM	NM	
Japan Value	NM	NM	NM	NM	
TPG, 2Q2024 Earnings Release					

Keppel's goal to scale to S\$200bn FUM is contingent on the performance of its funds. Success begets success, while a manager's poor performance leads to existing investors dropping out and great difficulty in finding new investors. Acquisitions of other fund managers (like Aermont), will boost FUM but will prove to be ephemeral, should there be sub-par performance. Fund managers with stellar returns are incentivized to publicise it, while a manager's reticience could lead to concerns on returns.

Without performance disclosures, stakeholders are deprived of a basis to assess Keppel's investment ability and the prospects of achieving its S\$200bn FUM.

INVESTOR CONFIDENCE OBSCURED BY LACK OF FUND SIZE/VINTAGE

ITS IMPORTANCE

Individual fund sizes provide valuable information on investors' confidence in the manager's strategy and performance. A larger follow-on fund indicates strong investor confidence, while decreasing fund size indicates the opposite. A fund's vintage allows for benchmarking the fund against others of the same period. It also allows analysts to track the remaining life of the fund and the manager's success in raising a follow-on fund.





Blackstone **w**

Blackstone's disclosure is excellent. Its vintage has the beginning and end of the investment period, allowing benchmarking against funds by other managers of similar vintages. It fully discloses fund sizes.

(\$/€ in thousands, except where noted) Fund (Investment Period Beginning Date / Ending Date)		Committed Capital	Available Capital (b)
Credit			
Mezzanine / Opportunistic I (Jul 2007 / Oct 2011)	\$	2,000,000	97,114
Mezzanine / Opportunistic II (Nov 2011 / Nov 2016)		4,120,000	993,260
Mezzanine / Opportunistic III (Sep 2016 / Jan 2021)		6,639,133	1,121,775
*Mezzanine / Opportunistic IV (Jan 2021 / Jan 2026)		5,016,771	1,624,659
Blackstone, 2Q2024 Earnings Release			

The extract exemplifies the benefits of disclosure. A Blackstone investor (i) sees that the Credit funds are generally well-received due to the increasing fund sizes, (ii) is aware and can investigate a possible issue in Fund III, that is followed by a smaller Fund IV.

Keppel's opacity means that it can't be seen whether successive funds grew or shrank in size (For eg. Keppel Asia Macro Trends Fund III vs. Fund II). It is also opaque when it comes to whether successor funds can be raised or how long it takes (e.g. Keppel Asia Macro Trends Fund IV vs III). Organic growth in FUM could thus be due to a strong track record attracting investors which is sustainable; it could also be due to Keppel's venturing into 'hot growth' sectors despite lacking deep expertise within which begs the question of sustainability. The lack of vintage disclosure makes benchmarking impossible. **It thus begs the question - why is Keppel withholding such information?**


FEE BREAKDOWNS SHOW REVENUE DRIVER AND VIABILITY OF FIRM STRATEGY

ITS IMPORTANCE

An asset manager's strategy determines if its revenue driver would be management or performance fees.

Management Fees: Typically a percentage of FUM, it provides a stable and recurring revenue stream, even during downturns. Earnings growth is via increasing FUM, with the criticism of this being misaligned with investors, who seek performance-driven results.

Performance Fees: Earned when performance exceeds a benchmark, it can lead to bumper profits or nothing, depending on performance. While clients value the alignment of incentives, its volatility can result in a lower valuation multiple for the asset management firm.







TPG consistently discloses a complete breakdown of all fees, along with clear fee definitions. This allows for deep analysis of each item. A stakeholder can clearly see that TPG's management fees are increasing while its performance allocations had a large fall compared to 2021, flagging it out for further investigation.

	2023		2022		2021	
Management fees	S	1,187,947	\$	919,830	S	718,344
Monitoring fees		10,866		14,330		14,324
Transaction fees		99,427		97,909		90,606
Incentive fees		2,815		5,183		_
Expense reimbursements and other		233,571		209,383		154,630
Total fees and other		1,534,626		1,246,635		977,904
Performance allocations		808,248		720,106		3,792,861
Capital interests		47,037		36,146		205,622
Total capital allocation-based income		855,285		756,252		3,998,483
Total revenues	S	2,389,911	S	2,002,887	\$	4,976,387


TPG, FY23 Annual Report

Keppel claims that its operating capability differentiates it from 'other asset managers' and with that, the implicit promise of better returns. However, the lack of disclosure makes it impossible to determine if Keppel is indeed generating better returns and hence higher and consistent performance fees. Keppel's asset management business model and value proposition is thus unclear and unsubstantiated. **This lack of disclosure is contradictory to both local and global standards.**


MISSING: COMPENSATION EXPENSE & PROFITABILITY OF ASSET MANAGEMENT

ITS IMPORTANCE

The asset management landscape is highly competitive, with dominant incumbents. The industry is reliant on highly paid talent due to the specialized skills and networks needed to deliver superior performance - compensation is thus a core expense. Smaller and newer asset managers are disadvantaged; paying top dollars to attract and afford top-tier talent could mean short term losses, while the superior returns may take time to materialize. Compensation expense and net profits are key metrics to evaluate an asset manager's success.







As pure-play asset managers, TPG's and Blackstone's compensation expense and net profits will naturally reflect its asset management business, while Keppel would need extra steps in breaking out its asset management segment from its other operating units. However, that should not distract one of the key points - namely, that Keppel's asset management cannot be analysed and benchmarked against its peers, unless it matches the same level of disclosure. **Stakeholders are in the dark for the all-important matter of Keppel's approach in recruiting and compensating talent. Furthermore, the full nature of Keppel's asset management profit is obscured.**

LOOKING AHEAD: DETAILED FUND-RAISING ROADMAP TO BUILD CONFIDENCE

ITS IMPORTANCE

It is fitting to conclude this report by looking ahead.

Both Keppel and CapitaLand have an ambitious target to achieve S\$200bn FUM by 2029/30. An asset manager with such a large FUM would currently be within the top 150 asset managers worldwide (Pensions & Investment, 2024). For such an ambitious endeavor, investors would benefit from a detailed roadmap.

Keppel 🗸

In presentations, Keppel releases general roadmap details.



It does furnish further details in its press releases and Investor Q&As, discussing the expected growth rates of Aermont Capital, along with the upcoming areas in which its new funds would focus on. However, the milestones for the interim years to 2030 is not disclosed.



While its focus on certain geographies and sectors are discussed, it does not disclose milestones for the interim years within its 5 year target.

Keppel (and its peers) may be reluctant to release a detailed roadmap, due to the difficulties in projecting into the future. That, if true, only underscores the even greater difficulties that stakeholders face when evaluating Keppel.

Due to the aforementioned lack of information on,

(1) fund performance, (2) fund size and vintage, (3) fee breakdowns and (4) asset management expenses & profits Stakeholders are unable to gain a sense of Keppel's asset management progress and prospects of success.

CML ISSUES A CALL FOR KEPPEL.